Who gets the ventilator? Important legal rights in a pandemic by Liddell, Kathleen et al.
Liddell K, et al. J Med Ethics 2020;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106332     1
Who gets the ventilator? Important legal rights in 
a pandemic
Kathleen Liddell, Jeffrey M. Skopek, Stephanie Palmer, Stevie Martin, 
Jennifer Anderson, Andrew Sagar
Current controversy
To cite: Liddell K, Skopek JM, 
Palmer S, et al. J Med Ethics 
Epub ahead of print: [please 
include Day Month Year]. 
doi:10.1136/
medethics-2020-106332
Faculty of Law, University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Correspondence to
Dr Kathleen Liddell, Faculty of 
Law, University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge CB3 9DZ, UK;  
 k. liddell@ law. cam. ac. uk
Received 20 April 2020
Accepted 20 April 2020
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2020. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published 
by BMJ.
InTroduCTIon
COVID-19 is a highly contagious infection with no 
proven treatment. Approximately 2.5% of patients 
need mechanical ventilation while their body fights 
the infection.1 Once COVID-19 patients reach the 
point of critical illness where ventilation is neces-
sary, they tend to deteriorate quickly. During the 
pandemic, patients with other conditions may also 
present at the hospital needing emergency ventila-
tion. But ventilation of a COVID-19 patient can last 
for 2–3 weeks. Accordingly, if all ventilators are in 
use, there will not be time for patients to ‘queue 
up’ to wait for those who arrived earlier to recover. 
Those who need a ventilator will die if they do not 
receive access to one quickly.
Many nations now face the prospect that they 
failed to prepare appropriately for this foreseen 
risk of pandemic (another issue worthy of legal 
analysis) and that their populations will need far 
more ventilators than the health service can supply. 
For many weeks, the UK has been anticipating a 
surge of COVID-19 infections that could leave 
patients queuing in hospitals for ICU care. Luckily, 
social distancing has ‘flattened the curve’ and this 
problem might not arise. There is still a degree of 
risk, however, and other countries will not be so 
lucky.
At some point, during this pandemic or the next, 
all countries will need to answer hard questions 
about whether and when scarce ICU resources (such 
as ventilators, beds and staff) should be either with-
held or withdrawn from certain groups of patients 
solely for the purpose of providing them to others. 
Attempts to answer these questions can be found 
in a wide range of ICU triage protocols and ethical 
guidance documents, many of which embrace the 
foundational principle of ‘save the most lives’. 
Unfortunately, this worthwhile goal has generated 
many suggestions that could violate the law.
This article identifies ten ways in which the 
withholding or withdrawal of a clinically indicated 
ventilator might violate a patient’s rights, along 
with recommendations on how to avoid doing so. 
While our analysis is based on UK law, it is relevant 
for other countries with similar legal systems. If the 
issues we identify are not addressed, doctors may 
act unlawfully. Worse, patients may die unlawfully.
CurrenT polICIes and guIdanCe
The UK government controversially abandoned 
its plans to create a national policy for triage deci-
sions during the COVID-19 pandemic.2 As a result, 
at present, the only central guidance comes from 
the ‘COVID-19 Rapid Guideline’ issued by the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE), which recommends triaging admission to 
the ICU based on frailty assessments, but provides 
little concrete guidance on how to allocate or re- al-
locate ventilators once a patient is in the ICU.3 Thus, 
if there is a ventilator shortage, these decisions will 
need to be made at the local or regional level by 
doctors, hospitals and the National Health Service 
(NHS) Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) that 
are responsible for health service management and 
procurement. This could lead to ‘postcode’ lotteries 
where patients have different rights to ventilators 
in different hospitals, not to mention insufficient 
clarity for patients about their rights to life- saving 
treatment.
There are many sources that one could draw on 
in developing a local, regional or national policy to 
govern the withholding and withdrawal of venti-
lation.4–10 There are triage policies that set out 
detailed protocols for the use of ventilators, as well 
as ethical guidelines created by professional bodies, 
governments, and medical ethicists. Problematically, 
many of these sources pay insufficient attention to 
legal requirements.
For example, NICE suggests that ‘decision- 
making support’ can be found in a guidance note 
published by the British Medical Association 
(BMA)—a trade association for doctors.3 This is 
concerning, given that in our view, some of the 
BMA guidance fails to sufficiently acknowledge 
patients’ legal rights. Regarding the withholding of 
treatment, the BMA suggests that decisions be based 
on a patient’s relative ‘capacity to benefit quickly’, 
which could result in the denial of treatment to 
patients with poorer prognoses—patients who are 
also more likely to be elderly, disabled or chron-
ically ill. Regarding the withdrawal of treatment, 
the BMA adopts the same approach, acknowl-
edging that this could ‘involve withdrawing from 
an individual who is stable or even improving but 
whose objective assessment indicates a worse prog-
nosis than another patient who requires the same 
resource’.11 The only time the BMA departs from 
this approach is for patients who work in ‘essen-
tial services’, including healthcare workers, who it 
suggests might be given priority if so authorised by 
the government.
While the various guidelines that we have 
reviewed differ in many ways, they are generally 
infused with the same ethical principle: ‘save the 
most lives possible’. They take the view that when 
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there are multiple critically ill patients, each with an equal ethical 
claim to be ventilated and not enough ventilators for all, doctors 
should prioritise patients who are more likely to recover swiftly 
(thereby clearing the ventilators for other patients in need).
Saving as many lives as possible is a worthy goal, but this prin-
ciple can occlude the consideration of patients’ legal rights—
rights that are not suspended merely because a crisis has occured. 
So even if the principle is used as the primary touchstone, the 
goal should be: ‘save the most lives possible without violating 
the rights of patients.’ Of course, this should go without saying, 
but many legally enforceable rights have been overlooked in the 
ethically focused guidelines that have been produced thus far.
unappreCIaTed ComplexITIes
When analysing how ventilators should be allocated or re- allo-
cated in the COVID-19 pandemic, medical ethicists often appeal 
to simplified cases, such as Taurek’s famous lifeboat thought 
experiment.12 Another thought experiment cropping up is the 
trolley problem: should one pull the lever to divert the trolley so 
that it kills one rather than five?
While these simplified cases can be useful for exploring our 
ethical intuitions, they can also be dangerous, as they erase 
important details that make a significant difference to ethical 
and legal analysis. For example, as outlined below, a policy for 
ventilator allocation needs to take account of: (1) clinical impli-
cations, (2) evidentiary weaknesses, (3) ethical controversy, (4) 
subjective judgements and (5) organisational complexity.
1. Clinical implications
Ordinarily, when a ventilator is withdrawn, the patient is extu-
bated and turned over if prone (face down). This action could 
constitute a battery if done without consent to a patient who 
still has a fair chance of survival. Merely detaching the ventilator 
machine as a modular unit might avoid this, with a legal sleight 
of hand that every subsequent action would be medical manage-
ment for the patient post- withdrawal. However, the patient will 
need to be brought out of sedation in order to activate his (or 
her) respiratory reflex. Continued sedation would hasten death 
and this could constitute unlawful killing unless it is clinically 
indicated, which is inherently not the case if withdrawal is based 
solely on resource grounds. As ventilator treatment for the 
patient is still indicated, the clinical team should try to bring the 
patient out of sedation and help the patient survive until another 
ventilator is available. During ventilator withdrawal, however, 
there is a strong chance the patient will be confused, anxious and 
distressed, particularly if still face down. He will likely cough 
and claw at the tube that is left in his throat (since the doctors 
may not have consent to remove it) and experience a feeling 
of suffocation. The patient will need to be calmed by medical 
staff, who may offer non- sedating pain therapy. They will also 
need to tell the patient that he still needs a ventilator, that it was 
withdrawn to help another patient, and that he can rejoin the 
ventilator wait- list.
2. evidentiary weaknesses
A task force of ICU experts on mass critical care concluded in 
2014: ‘Critical care triage is a complex process that requires 
significant planning, preparation, and infrastructure for it to be 
conducted ethically and efficiently. At present, the prognostic 
tools required to produce an effective decision support system 
(triage protocol) are lacking along with most of the infra-
structure, processes, legal protections, and training for critical 
care triage.’13 It is difficult to attribute relative probabilities of 
survival to patients, or to anticipate length of bed stay, with 
a novel disease like COVID-19.14 Data are emerging from 
China, Italy and Spain, but are limited. Inferences can be 
made from more established data on acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (ARDS) and viral pneumonia, but the data thus far 
on COVID-19 suggest that it might differ in important ways 
from these other diseases. While clinical physiological tools such 
as SOFA (Sequential Organ Failure Assessment) and APACHE 
(Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation) help predict 
clinical outcomes, they may not be practical under pandemic 
conditions (eg, SOFA requires laboratory tests for which there 
may be shortages or delays). Furthermore, studies have shown 
that even the best tools for predicting clinical outcomes during 
the H1N1 pandemic were satisfactory, but not good. SOFA 
assessment is vulnerable to clinicians’ subjectivities, and missing 
data points create added uncertainty. Stratifying patients into 
priority groups is not a clear science; if the criteria are too strict, 
resources will be wasted, yet if they are too loose, the increase 
in lives saved will be limited. Change in SOFA score over time 
may be a useful predictor of clinical outcomes for patients with 
ARDS and pneumonia, but its predictive value is low when the 
intervals are too short. A common proposal in ventilator triage 
policies is to re- assess patients after 48 hours of ventilation, but 
this may not be enough time to observe change that would be a 
meaningful predictor of outcomes.15
3. ethical controversy
There is considerable disagreement about the ethics of resource 
allocation. The principle ‘save the most lives’ is intuitively 
appealing, but translating it into a policy that allocates ventila-
tors to patients who are expected to make faster recoveries puts 
those who have pre- existing health conditions at a disadvan-
tage. Poor health is affected by, inter alia, age, disability, socio- 
economic status and genetic luck (eg, ACE2 polymorphisms),16 
which may not themselves be fair grounds for rationing. Focusing 
instead on ‘save the most life years’ is another option, but it faces 
many of the same objections and deprioritises the elderly even 
if they are expected to make a fast recovery. The argument that 
the elderly should be deprioritised on the basis that they have 
‘had a fair innings’ aligns with some conceptions of fairness, but 
not all. Perhaps we should make reasonable adjustments for the 
less privileged or to save people judged to have special value 
(eg, those who help maintain essential services) or to be more 
deserving (eg, those who shouldered extra risks treating infec-
tious patients), but such adjustments would depart from the 
egalitarian idea that everyone should count for one and only 
one, given the difficulties of comparing and valuing lives.17 In 
addition, it is difficult to show that withdrawal policies actually 
benefit the public interest, as they could lead to loss of trust in 
the NHS and the range of societal costs that this could bring.17
4. subjective judgements
If decisions are made by doctors on a case- by- case basis, without 
reference to an agreed and detailed policy, they may be incon-
sistent, arbitrary, unfair and/or discriminatory—and thus, poten-
tially illegal. It is easy for clinicians’ personal subjectivities, and 
even their broadly accurate clinical generalisations, to improp-
erly influence their clinical judgements about individual patients. 
The fact that the average 68- year- old may be less fit than the 
average 50- year- old should not supplant a particularised assess-
ment of the individual 68- year- old patient. Likewise, patients 
with disabilities should not be reduced to stereotypes about their 
‘probable’ quality of life.
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5. organisational complexity
The organisation of medical care, including the provision and 
distribution of critical care services, spans many parties beyond 
the patient’s medical team, both within the hospital (eg, the 
ICU’s director and the hospital’s director of clinical services) 
and beyond.18 Hospitals are commissioned to provide care by 
CCGs and (to a lesser extent) NHS England.19 NHS England 
has published a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the 
management of surge and escalation in adult critical care, but 
it does not detail withholding or withdrawing ventilators.19 The 
SOP states that the procedure should be read in conjunction with 
local and site- specific escalation plans, along with ‘other crit-
ical care service operational policies together with national and 
professional bodies’ guidance’.19 Managing a surge of patients 
is not straightforward to organise centrally because it depends 
on case- mix, availability of staff and equipment, the disease’s 
impact on critical care admission rates, and other factors.19 
Directions can be given by NHS England Strategic Command, 
the NHS England Region, local Critical Care Networks, CCGs, 
and local and site- specific management.19
relevanT areas of law
The COVID-19 dilemma is unprecedented—and the legal issues 
untested. In most countries, there will be numerous relevant 
areas of law, all with nuances that need to be analysed. In the 
UK, for example, one needs to consider the following:
 ► Criminal law
 – The criminal offences related to patient death (murder 
and gross negligence manslaughter) and patient care (as-
sault, battery, ill- treatment, or willful neglect), both of 
which allow liability for omissions.
 ► Human rights law
 – Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR): the right to life (which includes an obligation 
on the State to make regulations compelling public and 
private hospitals to adopt appropriate measures for the 
protection of their patients’ lives).20 21
 – Article 3 of the ECHR: the right not to be subject to 
inhuman or degrading treatment.
 – Article 8 of the ECHR: the right to respect for one’s 
private and family life (which includes the duty to con-
sult with patients when denying them life- sustaining 
treatment).22
 – Article 14 of the ECHR: the right to the protection of the 
above rights without discrimination.
 ► Civil law
 – The law of battery and negligence, including:
 – The duty of care that applies when withholding or 
withdrawing treatment under Bolam23/Bolitho.24
 – The duty to disclose material risks when obtaining 
consent for intubation and ventilation under Mont-
gomery.25
 – The potential defences to tort claims based on the excep-
tional circumstances created by the pandemic.
 ► Public and administrative law
 – The National Health Service Act 2006 requirement that 
CCGs provide health services ‘to the extent they consid-
er necessary to meet the reasonable requirements of the 
persons for whom they have responsibility’.
 – The administrative law principles that prohibit public 
authorities from making irrational decisions or decisions 
that disproportionately affect the rights of individuals.
 – The Equality Act 2010 provisions that prohibit direct 
and indirect discrimination.
 – The case law on the rationing of scarce resources such as 
drugs, therapies and organs.
 ► Professional regulations
 – The rules and guidelines created by professional organ-
isations and regulators, such as the General Medical 
Council (GMC).
 ► Laws on decision- making for incapacitated adults
 – Protections under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which 
requires that incapacitated patients be treated in their 
best interests.
 ► Derogations from the current law
 – Potential legislative indemnities (eg, the discretionary in-
demnity provided by the Coronavirus Act 2020).
 – Potential legislative immunities from criminal and/or civ-
il liability.26
 – Potential derogations from the ECHR pursuant to Article 
15.27
poTenTIal vIolaTIons and reCommendaTIons
Given the numerous and complex areas of law that are appli-
cable to a decision to withhold or withdraw ventilation, it is 
crucial that debates about ventilator allocation policies engage 
directly with these legal issues. Ethical guidance from clinicians 
and ethicists cannot be translated into operational guidance 
without proper consideration of the myriad legal duties of the 
various individuals and institutions involved. Many of the poli-
cies that have been proposed could result in unlawful behaviour 
by hospitals and doctors and unlawful loss of patient life.
The legality of withholding or withdrawing ventilation that 
is clinically indicated will depend on many factors, including 
the details of the triage policy and who authored it. There is an 
important legal difference between: (1) a policy adopted by the 
government, the NHS, NICE, a CCG, the doctor’s hospital, or 
a professional regulator (eg, GMC, Royal College of Anaesthe-
tists, etc); and (2) a policy suggested by the BMA, the Intensive 
Care Society, medical ethicists, or similar sources. This is not 
because information disseminated by any of the latter is inher-
ently flawed, but rather because it is unauthoritative. As such, 
relying on it exposes doctors to legal risk.
For doctors, hospitals, CCGs and others who want to know 
what to do, we have investigated the law applicable in the UK. 
While there is some legal uncertainty that can only be resolved 
by courts, our current view is that the best interpretation of the 
legal landscape is as follows.
withholding ventilation
Recommendation 1
Doctors should not withhold a ventilator from a patient for 
whom it is clinically indicated based on predictions of relative 
clinical effectiveness, unless:
a. they apply a publicly available policy that has been issued or 
approved by an organisation with legal authority to direct 
doctors how to distribute limited resources among their ac-
tual and potential patients; or
b. they are faced with multiple patients presenting at the same 
time and not enough ventilators for all.
Rationale: Doctors cannot be forced to provide treatment 
contrary to their clinical judgement,28 29 but they have a duty 
to treat their patients with reasonable care and skill. Thus, if 
ventilation is clinically indicated, it is doubtful that doctors can 
unilaterally decide to withhold care on the grounds that a scarce 
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resource would be more effectively used on future (anticipated) 
patients. Doctors are generally permitted, and expected, to 
make decisions in line with lawful policies adopted by the NHS, 
their CCGs or their hospitals.30 But they take substantial legal 
risks if they apply guidelines that are not publicly available (see 
recommendation 9) or that were created by individuals or bodies 
that lack legal authority over medical practice and healthcare 
rationing. The only exception is if a doctor has multiple patients 
presenting at the same time and not enough ventilators for all; 
in this case, it will be necessary to withhold treatment from some 
even if a governing policy has not been established. Although 
doctors may not face personal civil liability for withholding 
care—as they will generally be indemnified by their hospitals or 
possibly the Coronavirus Act 2020—some patients could lose 
their lives unlawfully if doctors follow advice from unauthori-
tative sources.
Recommendation 2
NHS England, CCGs and hospitals should familiarise themselves 
with the limits of the data that support current triage policies, 
as these limits cast doubt on the possibility of reliably predicting 
patient outcomes.
Rationale: Public authorities must ensure that their decisions 
are rational and, where they engage the rights of individuals, 
proportionate. The Human Rights Act 1998 requires that they 
comply with the incorporated ECHR rights. Thus, those that are 
creating triage policies must carefully assess whether the evidence 
behind their policies is truly robust. Small differences between 
patients may not be clinically meaningful, and a decision to 
withhold ventilatory care could be legally challenged by patients 
or their families on the grounds that it is irrational, arbitrary 
or disproportionate in light of the limited evidence. Decisions 
that affect human rights and patients who are comparatively 
powerless are subject to greater scrutiny by the courts.31 32 Thus, 
the authorities—and non- authoritative organisations—that are 
creating triage policies must be careful to avoid encouraging 
flawed decision- making at the institutional or individual level.
Recommendation 3
Priority should not be given to particular groups of patients 
based on instrumentalist grounds, such as the social value of 
their jobs.
Rationale: As a matter of public law, this type of prioritisation 
could be challenged for being irrational and/or disproportionate 
when the evidence is inspected. For example, the evidence might 
not support the assumption that a doctor who has just recovered 
from a critical COVID-19 infection will recover the strength 
to work in time to save additional lives during the pandemic, 
or that a worker helping to maintain critical infrastructure like 
electricity services is contributing more to society than a person 
caring for their friends and family. Furthermore, as a matter of 
civil law and professional regulation, it is unlikely that doctors’ 
duty of care can be modified based on their view about the 
social value of a patient’s job or lack of employment. This could 
amount to negligence, or even gross negligence manslaughter if 
the patient dies.
Recommendation 4
Although assessment of what is appropriate for a given patient 
must be based in clinical judgement, triage policies should not 
rely too much on the discretion of doctors. Policies should set 
out a standardised method to stratify patients’ relative priorities, 
with tie- breaker principles if necessary (eg, time on the ward, or 
random selection).
Rationale: A triage policy that relies on discretion may result 
in arbitrary and inconsistent allocation decisions. This approach 
could breach Article 2 of the ECHR, which requires that States 
take appropriate steps to safeguard patients’ lives, including 
through the creation of effective regulatory regimes.20 21 This 
approach could also engage Article 8, which requires that deci-
sions to deny life- saving treatment be made in accordance with a 
set of criteria that are clear and accessible (see recommendation 
9).33 The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care could be 
failing in his overarching responsibility for healthcare if he does 
not take sufficient steps at a national level to protect patients’ 
rights in the allocation of ventilators during the pandemic, 
particularly if the absence of a national policy results in wide-
spread violations of patient rights.34
Recommendation 5
If a ventilator is clinically indicated for a patient, it should not 
be withheld because the patient has a disability, which includes 
a substantial and long- term impairment such as a chronic illness 
(e.g. diabetes, pulmonary hypertension, COPD, cystic fibrosis). 
It might be permissible to withhold treatment based on the 
more general criterion that a poor outcome from COVID-19 is 
predicted, but this approach should be evaluated to determine 
whether it effectively disadvantages those with specific chronic 
illnesses or other disabilities. If so, the approach should only 
be used if there is strong evidence that reliably predicts poor 
outcomes and alternative non- discriminatory criteria could 
not be used instead. (The same restrictions apply to age- based 
criteria). Reasonable adjustments for disabilities may also be 
required, such as altering the prioritisation criteria or length-
ening time- limited ventilation trials, if a patient with a disability 
does not have the same capacity to benefit as quickly as a patient 
without that disability.
Rationale: Many chronic illnesses and impairments satisfy the 
definition of ‘disability’ in the Equality Act 2010.35 If treatment 
is denied because of disability—or if the disability is an ‘effective 
cause’ of the denial—this would constitute direct discrimination 
in violation of the Act. There is no defence for this. If instead, 
ventilation is denied on the basis of physiological criteria that 
predict poor outcomes (eg, oxygen saturation, organ failure, 
blood pressure, etc), the question becomes whether the criteria 
place patients with a disability at a particular disadvantage or 
treat them unfavourably because of something arising from their 
disability. If so, the use of the criteria is only lawful if it is ‘a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. Otherwise, 
it constitutes indirect discrimination in violation of the Act. 
While the ‘legitimate aim’ requirement will likely be satisfied 
by the aim of allocating limited NHS resources efficiently, the 
‘proportionate means’ requirement will only be satisfied if there 
is evidence that the criteria are sufficiently precise and accurate 
to achieve the aim and that they are reasonably necessary to 
do so.36 (Age is also a protected characteristic, and age- based 
discrimination is likewise only lawful where it is a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim). For those with disabilities, 
the Equality Act 2010 also includes a duty to make reasonable 
adjustments so that they are not placed at a substantial disadvan-
tage.35 Furthermore, CCGs, hospitals and NICE must consider 
how disabled patients might be adversely impacted by their guid-
ance (including, for example, NICE’s endorsement of the BMA’s 
guidance).
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withdrawal of ventilation
Recommendation 6
Clinically indicated ventilation should not be withdrawn before 
a trial of treatment has been completed, and it should only be 
done pursuant to a triage policy that satisfies the above require-
ments for withholding treatment.
Rationale: Withdrawal that does not comply with this recom-
mendation would arguably constitute inhuman or degrading 
treatment in violation of the State’s obligations under Article 
3 of the ECHR. The act of withdrawing a ventilator from a 
patient for whom it is clinically indicated, in conjunction with 
the actions associated with this step (eg, un- sedating the patient 
so that his respiratory reflexes can kick in), would constitute 
active “treatment” for the purpose of Article 3.37 This cannot 
be justified on the basis of resource constraints. While resource 
constraints can limit the State’s affirmative duty to protect 
a person from inhuman and degrading treatment,38 they are 
irrelevant to the State’s negative duty. This type of withdrawal 
could also engage the State’s obligations under Article 2, for 
although it may not constitute intentional deprivation of life, 
it could breach the State’s positive obligation to adopt appro-
priate measures to protect patients’ lives and to have a clear legal 
framework regulating the medical profession.20 21 The European 
Court in Lambert acknowledged that the margin of appreciation 
is not unlimited.21
Doctors may also be held directly liable for this type of with-
drawal, which could constitute a breach of their duties of care 
under civil law (eg, battery, negligence) and criminal law (eg, 
gross negligence manslaughter, criminal battery, ill- treatment 
or willful neglect), as well as their professional duties. It is 
important to remember that when doctors withdraw a ventilator 
on resource allocation grounds, they are dealing with a patient 
for whom a ventilator has been judged to be clinically indicat-
ed—a judgement that has been based on factors including the 
patient’s chance of recovery, the quality of life he may enjoy 
afterwards, and the patient's expected reaction to the invasive-
ness of mechanical ventilation and other ICU supportive thera-
pies. Thus, whenever possible the patient should be un- sedated 
to give him a chance of surviving until another ventilator is avail-
able; otherwise, the doctor would be hastening his death. While 
withdrawal should of course be permitted where ventilation 
is no longer clinically indicated, doctors may need to provide 
patients with a sufficiently long trial to develop a robust assess-
ment of how they respond before reaching this conclusion.28 39
Recommendation 7
Unreasonably short time- limited trials should not be imple-
mented to enable the withdrawal of treatment that remains clin-
ically indicated.
Rationale: Although time- limited trials of ventilation may 
be clinically appropriate to determine how a patient responds, 
and although it might be permissible to provide shorter trials 
than would be provided outside the COVID-19 crisis, the trial 
periods should be clinically meaningful. The UK Supreme Court 
has warned against making decisions to withdraw life- supportive 
treatment when a patient’s condition is unpredictable or fluc-
tuating.36 If doctors unilaterally impose a time limit that is too 
short to be clinically meaningful, they may be in breach of their 
duty of care. If an authority (eg, government, hospital, CCG) 
specifies such a limit, it could be challenged on evidentiary 
grounds under administrative law for irrationality. Imposing 
unreasonable time limits or assessment criteria on ventilation 
trials could also be unlawful if they amount to constructive with-
drawal of ventilation.
Recommendation 8
If, contrary to recommendation 6, a policy is adopted that allows 
a ventilator to be withdrawn based solely on relative prioritisa-
tion of patients (or if a doctor adopts such an approach in the 
absence of a policy), this decision must be proactively disclosed 
to potentially affected patients as a material risk before obtaining 
their consent to intubation and ventilation.
Rationale: Failure to inform the patient that ventilation may 
be withdrawn even if it is proving effective would breach the 
doctor’s duty of disclosure under Montgomery.25
public availability of ventilator triage policies
Recommendation 9
Policies that direct doctors to withhold or withdraw life- saving 
treatment must be clear and publicly available.
Rationale: The ECHR’s requirement that any interferences 
with the Article 8 right to privacy be ‘in accordance with the 
law’ has been interpreted as meaning that policies governing the 
denial of life- saving treatment must be clear and accessible.33
patient consultation
Recommendation 10
If a decision is taken to deny a patient life- supportive treatment 
(through withholding or withdrawal), the patient and/or the 
patient’s family members must be consulted.
Rationale: The duty to consult arises from Article 8 of the 
ECHR and the common law, and it is required even when 
consultation would cause the patient to suffer distress (short 
of actual harm).29 40 As the court explained in Tracey, this duty 
protects patients’ autonomy, integrity and dignity in the final 
days and moments of their lives, and it provides patients and 
family members with an opportunity to challenge the decision.41 
To be clear, this does not mean that the doctor must obtain 
the patient’s or family’s consent to the decision. Denial of life- 
supportive treatment can be lawful even without consent (see 
recommendations 6 and 7), but the duty to consult beforehand 
remains effective.
ConClusIon
If a ventilator triage policy is going to be based on the principle 
of ‘save the most lives,’ it must pay close attention to the legal 
rights that might be violated by this approach. An individual or 
family who believes that a ventilator is being unlawfully with-
held or withdrawn deserves to have the issues discussed in this 
article considered by the British courts, at least as a test case.21 
Pushing ahead with a general ethical principle rather than care-
fully scrutinising its operation in the complex clinical environ-
ment could be deeply problematic, especially for the elderly 
and people with chronic illnesses and disabilities. Doctors who 
follow such proposals may act unlawfully. Worse, patients may 
die unlawfully. Patients’ legal rights matter. Currently they are 
not being given the attention they deserve.
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